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DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF ASYLUM LAW
PETER MARGULIES*

The United States's commitment to protecting refugees is
dying a slow death. Two developments have contributed to its
demise. The first, widely heralded, is the United States Congress's evisceration of procedural safeguards such as judicial
review.' The second development is more insidious: expansion
of the asylum law doctrine, which holds that changed country
conditions can defeat an otherwise valid asylum claim.2 In an
age in which democracy seems triumphant throughout the
world, the combination of severely curtailed judicial review and
mechanical application of the changed conditions doctrine relegates refugees, as well as asylum law itself, to an uncertain fu* Professor of Law and Director, Immigration Clinic, St. Thomas University.
B.A., Colgate University, 1978; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1981. I thank Kevin
Johnson, Steve Legomsky, and Ellen Saideman for their comments on a previous
draft.
1. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (1994) (allowing judicial review of asylum determinations of the Attorney General only when such determinations are "manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion"); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(D)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997) (barring judicial review of administrative decision that
claimant is ineligible for asylum because of suspected terrorist activities); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (barring judicial review of administrative
decisions to remove persons from the United States because they have committed
certain criminal offenses); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm'n,
525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that deportation proceedings pending at the effective
date of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, are subject to the 1996 Act's limitations on judicial review,
unless otherwise provided for in the Act). For commentary discussing restrictions
of judicial review in immigration proceedings, see, for example, David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress's Control of Federal Jurisdiction,86 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas
Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961
(1998); cf. STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND

POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (1987) (discussing history of judicial review in
immigration context). Under the abuse of discretion standard in the new judicial
review provisions, most asylum decisions will become the virtually exclusive preserve of an agency in the Department of Justice-the Board of Immigration Appeals ("B.I.A.)-operating without effective guidance from the federal courts.
2. See DEBORAH ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (5th ed.
1999); GUY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-87 (1996).
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ture.' This article argues that the rise of the changed country
conditions doctrine stems from judicial and administrative confusion about both the role of both "subjective" and "objective"
factors in asylum law and the nature of democratic transitions.
Asylum law traditionally has incorporated both "subjective" and "objective" elements in an uneasy equipoise. Selfstyled champions of objectivity, or proponents of what I call
here the formalistic view, tend to defer to existing power relations in asylum and foreign policy. Formalists take their cue
from the positions of the United States State Department,
which historically has been hostile to refugees and has softpedaled human rights abuses among United States allies and
dependents.' Formalists are fond of floodgate arguments, invoking images of "aliens"-people perceived as racially or ethnically "different" from the United States majority-inundating
our shores.5 To send such uninvited guests back as often and

3. Developments on the ground in countries struggling to emerge from tyranny echo these concerns. See Barbara Crossette, The World Expected Peace. It
Found a New Brutality., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1
(noting that current events in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Haiti have complicated
the vision of the "newer, saner world order confidently anticipated when Communism collapsed a decade ago").
4.

See MARVIN E. FRANKEL & ELLEN SAIDEMAN, OUT OF THE SHADOWS OF

NIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 64-65 (1989) (noting
that "the American State Department regularly considers military and security
interests more important than human rights"); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The
Meaning of 'Persecution'in United States Asylum Law, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 5,
17 (1991) (expressing concern about "reliance upon the characterization of foreign
regimes expounded by the U.S. government's foreign policy organs"); David A.
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1331 (1990) (discussing political biases in asylum decision making); see also Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2558 (1993)
(discussing how foreign policy agendas stifled international focus on human rights
in the post-World War II era); cf. DAVID S. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE
JEWS: AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1941-1945 189 (1984) (noting that fear that
the United States would actually have to take in Jewish refugees if efforts to rescue Jews from the Nazi extermination apparatus were successful was "[b]y far the
most important cause for State Department inaction").
5. See Tanya K. Hernandez, The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in
the Structure of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731 (1997) (discussing interaction of stereotypes about immigrants and domestic subordinated
groups); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror"into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1140-41
(1998) (discussing influence of racism and nativism on American refugee policy);
Harold H. Koh, The "HaitiParadigm"in United States Human Rights Policy, 103
YALE L.J. 2391, 2422 (1994) (arguing that "the archetypal 'good alien' favored by
American immigration law is... white, European, healthy, heterosexual, [and]
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soon as possible, formalists take changes in "law on the books"
or the identity of government officials as sufficient proof of
changed conditions that obviate the refugee's fear of returning
to her country of origin.
The formalists' substantive agenda informs a procedural
agenda: formalists are wary of the asylum-seeker's voice. Giving the asylum-seeker's own testimony too much weight in
asylum adjudication swings open the floodgates that the formalist has sought mightily to close in substantive asylum doctrine. To contain this subjectivity, the formalistic view seeks to
impose two requirements: corroboration for asylum-seeker's
testimony and proof that persecution is more probable than not
if the asylum-seeker is forced to return.
The formalistic view contrasts with another model, which I
call the dynamic view. The dynamic view recognizes that a
rigid dichotomy between subjective and objective evidence can
obscure more than it illuminates.6 According to the dynamic
self-sufficient"); Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian
and Holocaust Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135 (1993) (discerning
parallels in the treatment of Haitian and Holocaust refugees); Janice D. Villiers,
Closed Borders, Closed Ports: Plight of Haitians Seeking Political Asylum in the
United States, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1994) (discussing race in Haitian asylum
adjudication); cf Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns,
Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An InternationalHuman Rights
Critique of Immigration and Welfare "Reform," 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547 (1998) (applying international law to address immigration and welfare measures with discriminatory impact on persons of color). But see Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105 YALE L.J. 1963, 1966 (1996) (reviewing PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN
NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995)) (arguing that race is a less important factor in immigration law today than it was in
earlier decades).
6. The dynamic view is also much more receptive to encompassing new
kinds of asylum claims, like those that view gender-based persecution as fitting
within the category of persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group. See Peter Margulies, Asylum, Intersectionality, and AIDS: Women with
HIV as a Persecuted Social Group, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 521 (1994). In addition,
the dynamic view is more willing to find that persecution occurs "on account of"
one of the five bases for asylum-race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and
membership in a particular social group-when a persecutor's motives are mixed,
or are a result of tacit understandings or stereotypes, instead of a specific intent
to punish the asylum-seeker. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)
(holding that a guerilla group's retaliation against an individual who declined to
join the group is not persecution based on political opinion, absent more specific
proof that the guerillas were motivated by an intent to punish the individual for
his political views). For commentary on proof of a more flexible view of intent, see
Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 18-23; Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question of Values:
Continuing Divergences Between U.S. and International Refugee Norms, 15
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 38 (1997); Joan Fitzpatrick, The InternationalDimension of
U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1 (1997); Margulies, supra; Karen
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view, State Department reports regarding changed country
conditions are no more "objective" than the asylum-seeker's
testimony. Each source of information has a bias. The State
Department's bias on human rights issues is simply more difficult for an adjudicator to discern behind the veneer of governmental legitimacy, authority, and competence. The formal
view takes laws on the books, as well as one-time events such
as elections, as proof of changed conditions. In contrast, the
dynamic view looks to law "on the ground," taking into account
the nature and variety of both formal and informal institutions,
and examines how they interact with society as a whole. The
dynamic view also has a more flexible view in matters of procedure, resolving uncertainty in the refugee's favor 7 and avoiding
rigid corroboration requirements for asylum-seekers' testi8
mony.
Dynamic and formalistic interpretations in the case law
are similar, however, in that they both proceed with little or no
acknowledgment of the rich empirical and theoretical literature
on social and governmental transitions that has developed in
the last quarter of the century.9 Synthesizing the transition
Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences: Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human
Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179 (1994); cf Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV. 733 (1998) (arguing for focusing on
core purposes of refugee protection, identified as nondiscrimination, condemnation of collective guilt, and freedom of thought and expression).
7. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that a tenpercent possibility of persecution renders an asylum-seeker's fear of returning to
her country of origin objectively "reasonable," because even a ten-percent chance
of the grave harm embodied in the concept of persecution would be material for
the reasonable person).
8. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that,
since the individual asylum-seeker's access to information about conditions in her
country of origin is often meager, corroboration of an asylum-seeker's testimony is
not necessary if the testimony is "believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed
to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for his fear").
9. See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION 7-9 (1996); Juan J. Linz et al., Democratic
Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin
America and Eastern Europe, in THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
77 (Richard Gunther et al. eds., 1995); Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl,
What Democracy Is... and Is Not, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 3 (Geoffrey
Pridham ed., 1995); Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a
New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998); Guillermo
O'Donnell, HorizontalAccountability in New Democracies, 9 J. DEMOCRACY, July
1998, at 112; Andreas Schedler, What is Democratic Consolidation?, 9 J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1998, at 91, 97; cf HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963)
(discussing transitions in French, Russian, and American revolutions). The issue
of legal redress for abuses committed by regimes prior to the transition has re-
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scholars' work reveals a focus on three elements. The first is
institutional repertoire, characterized as the country's range of
institutions, from so-called "civil society" to the executive and
legislative branches, and the formal or informal processes that
allow these institutions to interact. The second is inclusiveness, defined as the degree to which the country in question
treats all of its constituents as full members and minimizes inequity based on factors such as race, religion, ethnicity, class,
gender, or sexual orientation. The third element is redress, defined as the access of victims of human rights abuses to legal
remedies, and the presence of institutions willing and able to
hold human rights abusers legally accountable.
The transition scholars' approach could enhance changed
country conditions determinations by requiring adjudicators to
take into account more and better sources of evidence. However, judicial and administrative decisions based on the formal
model disdain the careful institutional analysis that the transition approach requires. Decisions taking a dynamic perspective often are made on a case-by-case basis, leaving the questions of institutional role and relationship stressed by
transition scholars either implicit, or else absent.
This article uses the transition scholars' research to refine
the dynamic model of both the substantive changed country
conditions doctrine and the procedural elements of asylum adjudication that interact with substantive refugee law. The dynamic model of changed country conditions advanced here addresses conditions "on the ground," concentrating on the
transition scholars' criteria of institutional repertoire, inclusiveness, and redress. It also incorporates a more flexible approach to proof and procedure in asylum adjudication. This
approach respects the refugee's testimony, and tailors standards of proof and corroboration to acknowledge the asylum
seeker's uncertainty, suffering, and lack of control. Fair allocation of the consequences of uncertainty, both in the analysis of
democratic transitions and in asylum procedure, is essential to
protecting refugees.
ceived careful examination from legal scholars, again unrewarded by sustained
and systematic attention in the cases on changed country conditions. See
MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY,
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997); Orentlicher, supra note 4; Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Jurisprudence:The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106
YALE L.J. 2009 (1997).
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The article consists of four parts. Part I discusses the dialectic between formalistic and dynamic models in asylum adjudication. Part II analyzes the failure of the formalistic model
to do justice to the unpredictable nature of democratic transitions. Part III responds to the flaws of formalism by advancing
a refined dynamic model for adjudicating changed country conditions issues in asylum cases. Part IV applies this refined dynamic model to three arenas in asylum law-two national and
one social-where the extent and impact of change is in dispute. The nations, both of which have spurred significant refugee movement into the United States, are Ethiopia, as a representative of African transitions to democracy, and Romania,
representing the uncertainties of transition in Eastern Europe.
The social arena is the subjection of women to social and physical oppression in the developing world. These examples demonstrate the careful analysis required to reach reliable determinations based on changed country conditions, and to fulfill
the purposes of American asylum law.
I.

FORMALISTIC AND DYNAMIC APPROACHES TO
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION

The formalistic and dynamic approaches arise from different views of four important factors in asylum adjudication: 1)
the significance of official changes in an asylum-seeker's country of origin-such as changes in the heads of government or
the text of statutes-for determining whether an individual
asylum-seeker has a "well-founded fear of persecution;" ° 2) the
responsibility of refugees or refugees' countries of origin for
their own plight; 3) the consequences of uncertain information
about both individual asylum claims and country conditions;
and 4) the deference owed to United States foreign policymakers. Approaches to each of these questions flow through conceptions of the "objective" and "subjective" in asylum law.

10. The Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997), defines a refugee as a person who is "unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." In re
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
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The formalistic and dynamic models of asylum adjudication represent very different approaches to law, politics, and
proof of facts. Formalists assert that law, as distinct from politics, is a "set of abstract concepts and principles with rationally
governed internal and external relations which mechanically
lead to specific answers in particular cases."" For formalists,
law becomes impermissibly political when it explicitly addresses social, economic, and political inequality, which formalists view as "outside" of law. 12 This mechanical approach,
when applied to the realm of asylum adjudication, shifts responsibility for the refugee's protection away from the country
granting refugee status. In fixing responsibility, formalists in

11.

BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 35 (1997).

12.

See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in

THE POLITICS OF LAW 23, 32 (rev. ed. 1998) ("The message the [formalist] model

conveys is that actual power relations in the real world are by definition legitimate."). American jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with its striking down of economic regulation, fueled by reliance on "freedom of contract" between employer and employee and disregard of inequality of
bargaining between these two parties, is usually taken by scholars as the heyday
of formalist thought. Id. at 18-21. While the middle twentieth century saw a retreat from formalism and an emphasis, courtesy of the legal realists and legal
process scholars, on the interaction of law and policy, the last 25 years have seen
a re-awakening of formalism in important areas such as statutory interpretation.
Id. at 21-33. Immigration law, with its foundation of precedent from the late
nineteenth century, has remained largely rooted in the parched soil of formalism.
Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545, 600613 (1990) (discussing attempts by courts and advocates to accommodate new conceptions of rights within the formalist model); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984) (same). The history of immigration law is a useful reminder, however, that formalism is not necessarily
about using legal distinctions to frustrate reform, as in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), and the other economic regulation cases, but is ultimately about
deference to inequality. Consider, for example, the nineteenth century precedents
that still dominate immigration law, resisting the fate of Lochner and Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889). In those cases, the Supreme Court typically upheld legislation
based on prejudice against immigrants perceived as racially "different." See Hernandez, Construction and Race, supra note 5. In any other area of American law,
such legislation would be struck down as substantively invidious and procedurally
infirm today. See also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581 (upholding Chinese Exclusion Act). Congress continues to enact invidious legislation in the immigration
arena. For critical interpretations of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA"), see Gilbert P. Carrasco, CongressionalArrogation of Power: Alien
Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591 (1994); Michael A. Scaperlanda, The Paradox of a Title: Discrimination in the AntiDiscriminationProvisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 1043.
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asylum adjudication look to the refugee herself, who is frequently viewed as motivated by economic factors, or look to to
the refugee's country of origin, which formalists regard as mistreating its own people in order to manipulate more prosperous
countries into easing their immigration controls."
This view influences how formalists define what constitutes "objective" and "subjective" evidence. Starkly put, objective evidence is that which is offered by officials of the United
States government, informed by assumptions based on United
States experience. Subjective evidence is evidence offered by
the refugee. Objective evidence demonstrates that persecution
upon an asylum-seeker's deportation to her country of origin is
probable, while subjective evidence demonstrates that it is
merely possible. In the area of changed country conditions,
objective evidence is evidence about changes in the identity of
government officials, constitutional structure, or the text of
statutes. Subjective evidence is the asylum-seeker's testimony
that she fears returning to her country of origin, because for-

13. In this view, countries of origin lose the incentive to deal with their own
political, economic, or ethnic "problems" if developed countries such as the United
States protect the refugees that those problems create. See In re H-,Interim
Dec. No. 3276 at 20 (B.I.A. May 30, 1996) (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting)
(characterizing majority's decision, which upheld remand in case involving Somalian refugee persecuted because of clan membership, as a "quixotic attempt to
right the wrongs of the world through the asylum process," and arguing against
viewing harms occurring to individuals during civil wars as persecution under the
Refugee Act). This disclaimer of responsibility was pervasive during the World
War II era. See IRVING ABELLA & HAROLD TROPER, NONE IS Too MANY: CANADA

AND THE JEWS OF EUROPE, 1933-1948 27 (1983) (quoting Canadian diplomat resisting admission of Jewish refugees during World War II, who asserted that,
"[o]ther governments with unwanted minorities must equally not be encouraged
to think that harsh treatment at home is the key that will open the doors to immigration abroad .... [N]o state should be allowed to throw upon other countries
the responsibility of solving its internal difficulties"). Today, concerns about allocation of responsibility for refugees, as well as preservation of the ethnic and cultural identity of countries accepting refugees, have fueled an increasing movement toward repatriation of asylum-seekers. See James C. Hathaway & R.
Alexander Neve, Making InternationalRefugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal
for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115
(1997) (arguing that provisions for the repatriation of refugees upon easing of the
threat of persecution in their country of origin are necessary to preserve the structure of international refugee protection). In the United States, refugees granted
asylum have the opportunity, one year after asylum is granted, to apply for lawful
permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (1999). However, one can view increasing use of the changed country conditions doctrine, which allows adjudicators
to deny asylum because conditions have changed, as the United States's version of
repatriation efforts.
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mal changes have not changed underlying patterns of inequality and persecution.
In contrast, the dynamic model views law, politics, and society as inextricably interrelated. Law has a crucial role in
remedying inequality. Shirking that role does not mean that
law is somehow "neutral" or "autonomous," but only that law
reinforces an inequitable status quo.14 In the asylum law
arena, the dynamic model is less prone to view asylum as a
scarce resource to be apportioned parsimoniously, and more
prone to resolve uncertainty in favor of granting refugees legal
protection in the United States. Moreover, the dynamic view
recognizes that formal indications of changed conditions, such
as changes in government officials or "law on the books," mean
little unless they are supported by changes "on the ground."
The dynamic view also has a different, more flexible view
of what constitutes subjective and objective evidence. While
asylum adjudicators taking a dynamic view still resort to the
rhetoric of objectivity and subjectivity, 5 the dynamic view generally gives more weight to refugee testimony. Indeed, the dynamic view recognizes that the testimony of a refugee, even
given the refugee's interest in obtaining asylum, can be as reliable as the views of the United States State Department. The
State Department, the dynamic model recognizes, is not neutral or autonomous, any more than law is. As it did in World
War II, the State Department today has an interest in downplaying human rights problems to avoid rocking the foreign
policy boat. 6 For that reason, the dynamic model holds that
automatic deference to State Department positions is not appropriate in asylum adjudication.

14. See Mensch, supra note 12, at 36-48.
15. Continued use of this rhetoric has some unfortunate results, including
maintenance of a vocabulary ready-made for a formalist backlash. See generally
infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
16. See Orentlicher, supra note 4. It is important to acknowledge that human rights issues are more salient in foreign policy discourse today than they
were in earlier eras, driven solely by a "realpolitik" conception of foreign affairs.
See id. Today, officials in the State Department include, for example, Harold Koh,
a prominent human rights scholar and refugee advocate. See Koh, supra note 5.
As the dynamic view holds, however, changing the identity of officials cannot
readily transform institutional interests and cultures of decades' duration.

12
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A. Persecution and Proof in Asylum Law
Case law, statutes, and regulations have always revealed a
dialectic between formalistic and dynamic visions of asylum
law. Indeed, the evolution of United States refugee policy in
the years since World War II, culminating in the enactment of
the Refugee Act, is in many ways a reaction to the rigidity of
refugee policy during the war. In the early years of the war,
the State Department remained indifferent and even hostile to
the plight of refugees." The harrowing narratives of refugees
who had escaped the concentration camps were dismissed as
fanciful, "subjective" tales. 8 Asylum law since the war has
proceeded from the view that wholesale dismissal of refugee
testimony risks a repeat performance of the United States' indifference to refugees' plight.
Refugee testimony poses a challenge for the adjudicator
that is ubiquitous throughout asylum law: how to deal with uncertainty. 9 Uncertainty in asylum adjudication is both retrospective and prospective. Retrospective uncertainty is inevitable because an asylum adjudicator has only limited information
about what has happened to a candidate for asylum. Geographic distance,2 ° the passage of time, cultural differences,2 '

17. This indifference was itself cloaked in the language of foreign policy effectiveness. Specifically, advocates for inaction argued that winning the war was
paramount, and other goals, including rescuing refugees, could distract from that
objective. See WYMAN, supra note 4, at 293-94. That rationale does not explain,
however, why the State Department went out of its way to deny refugees access to
immigration visas that had already been allocated by Congress. See id. at 316.
18. See Margulies, supra note 5, at 148.
19. It may be useful here, as we discuss issues of procedure in asylum adjudication, to briefly outline how an asylum claim is adjudicated. Some cases, involving refugees who come forward to claim asylum, start out in what is called the
affirmative stage, with an asylum application filed and a subsequent interview in
the Asylum Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). If the
Asylum Office rejects the claim, the asylum-seeker goes into removal proceedings
in the Immigration Court of the Department of Justice, along with refugees who
have been apprehended or through some other means brought to the attention of
INS. The decision of the Immigration Judge ("IJ") in removal proceedings is appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals. From there, appeals go to the federal courts, either by statute or via habeas corpus. The 1996 legislation restricts
review in asylum cases by moving from a substantial evidence standard to an
even more deferential "abuse of discretion and manifestly contrary to law" test.
See, e.g., Martin, supranote 4, at 1316.
20. See id. at 1280-81 (noting the high cost of investigating asylum claims
with personnel in the refugee's country of origin).
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the asylum seeker's ties to the United States,22 and the effects
of trauma 23 render evidence of persecution inaccessible. Prospective uncertainty is also pervasive. Predicting the future is
not a strength for most mere mortals, particularly when dealing, as in asylum cases, with the uncertain currents of political
change and their consequences for individuals.2 4
Faced with uncertainty, adjudicators must decide individual cases, knowing that the scope and purposes of refugee law
will not countenance either extreme of granting asylum to everyone, or turning everyone away. 25 To establish a happy mean
between these extremes, both dynamic and formalistic strains
21. See id. at 1286 ("Many asylum seekers come from societies where the
population inherently distrusts or fears government officials (and often lawyers).
Nothing in their past experience prompts them to open up readily to strangers....."). Cultural differences can also lead adjudicators to misinterpret information that the asylum seeker provides. For example, some time ago the St.
Thomas Immigration Clinic represented a Haitian refugee who was asked by the
Immigration Judge for his street address in Haiti. Our client responded that in
rural Haiti many people did not have street addresses. The IJ was incredulous,
and cited our client's answer as a basis for finding that he lacked credibility. In
the urban and suburban landscape of South Florida, shaped for the most part in
an orderly grid, the IJ's skepticism may have made sense. Yet, given the lack of
paved roads, running water, community organization, or literacy in areas of rural
Haiti, our client's response was far from incongruous. See PAUL FARMER, AIDS
AND ACCUSATION: HAITI AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF BLAME 34-35 (1992) (discussing

conditions in rural Haiti).
22. Such ties, or an asylum-seeker's desire to create them, clearly provide
some incentive to embellish or even fabricate testimony. See Martin, supra note
4, at 1281-82 (noting such incentives and remarks by adjudicators and INS trial
attorneys that "the asylum system is saved from complete collapse largely by the
admirable honesty of most of the applicants"); cf.Peter H. Schuck & Theodore H.
Wang, Continuity and Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts,
1979-1990, 45 STAN. L. REV. 115, 165-66 (1992) (tracing an increase in asylum
claims in late 1980's in part to easier availability at that time of work authorization for asylum applicants).
23. See Quentin Dignam, The Burden and the Proof Torture and Testimony
in the Determination of Refugee Status in Australia, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 343,
355-56 (1992); Martin, supra note 4, at 1286-87.
24. See Martin, supra note 4, at 1282-85 (noting difficulties both in obtaining information about present country conditions and predicting how those conditions might change over time); cf. Guillermo O'Donnell, On the Fruitful Convergences of Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty and Shifting Involvements:
Reflections from the Recent Argentine Experience, in DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY,
AND THE ART OF TRESPASSING 249, 253 (Alejandro Foxley et al. eds., 1986) (noting

that the military coup regime in Argentina applied "severe and cruel repression to
many individuals... in a decentralized, largely unpredictable, and usually clandestine way.... [Tihe risks [to individual victims] were as high as they were difficult to gauge").
25. See Martin, supra note 4, at 1330-34 (discussing costs of erroneous asylum grants, in terms of the credibility and political support available for refugee
protection).
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in asylum adjudication traditionally have invoked the rhetoric
of subjective and objective proof of an asylum seeker's claims.
This rhetoric, unfortunately, adds little to precedents following
a dynamic model, and serves merely to camouflage the arbitrariness of the formalistic view.2 6 The following paragraphs
analyze the holding and rhetoric in both dynamic and formalist
cases addressing retrospective and prospective uncertainty in
asylum adjudication.
A cornerstone of the dynamic model is INS v. CardozaFonseca.27 In Cardoza-Fonseca,the Supreme Court ruled that
the Refugee Act did not require an asylum applicant to prove
that it was more probable than not that she would be persecuted if she returned to her country of origin. Instead, the
court held that even a ten-percent chance of persecution would
constitute a "reasonable possibility" of persecution within the
meaning of the statute. The Court considered the perspective
of the applicant, for whom even a ten-percent chance of the
grave harm entailed by persecution would be material. Requiring the asylum-seeker to prove that persecution was probable, the Court observed, would violate the purpose of the
Refugee Act, by resolving uncertainty against the asylumseeker. Such an approach to uncertainty, the Court reasoned,
would exalt procedural formality, embodied by the conventional
preponderance standard, over the substantive predicament of
the refugee, hostage to the uncertain future of political change
in her country of origin.
Cardoza-Fonsecamuddied the waters in its invocation of a
subjective/objective dichotomy in asylum adjudication. The
Court noted that:

26. By arguing here that the rhetoric of objectivity in asylum adjudication is
flawed, I do not mean to reject the possibility of a more pragmatic conception of
objectivity. See generally Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in
Law and Morals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 523 (1996) (deconstructing radical skepticism).
Indeed, without such a pragmatic conception, it is difficult to describe a refugee as
having a "well-founded" fear of persecution at all, or decide that particular practices like imprisonment or torture constitute persecution. Rather, my purpose
here is simply to show that the rhetoric of objectivity in asylum adjudication buttresses elements of the formalist agenda, because tribunals using the rhetoric
tend inevitably to cast the State Department, with its mantle of legitimacy,
authority, and expertise, as the source of objectivity, and relegate the refugee to
the subjective role. With the roles thus cast, the formalist script writes itself.
27. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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[T]he reference to "fear" [in the Refugee Act's standard requiring a "well-founded fear of persecution" for a grant of
asylum] ... obviously makes the eligibility determination
turn to some extent on the subjective mental state of the
alien. "The linguistic difference between the words 'wellfounded fear' and 'clear probability' may be as striking as
that between
a subjective and an objective frame of refer28
ence."
The Court also cites the Board of Immigration Appeals
("B.I.A.") for the proposition that "the term 'fear' [in the Refugee Act] ... refers to a 'subjective condition, an emotion.'"29 On
the surface, this language seems like a blow against formalism.
The problem with this language, however, is twofold. First, the
language links emotion to subjectivity, thereby restricting emotion's role in "objective," cognitive processes such as adjudication.3 ° Second, the language associates subjectivity solely with
the asylum-seeker, leaving the field of objectivity to legitimated, authoritative, and expert institutions like the State Department. The net effect of the rhetoric reinforces the formalist
message by marginalizing the asylum claim as a perilous detour from the orderly path of law.
Another cornerstone of the dynamic approach to asylum
adjudication reveals the same trend: dynamic in result, but not
wholly free from formalism in rhetoric. Shortly after Cardoza3 ' holding that an
Fonseca, the B.I.A. decided In re Mogharrabi,
asylum applicant's uncorroborated testimony can support a
grant of asylum if the testimony is "believable, consistent, and
sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for his fear."3 2 The B.I.A. based its holding in
part on "the difficulties faced by many aliens in obtaining
documentary or other corroborative evidence."33 The rejection
of rigid corroboration requirements clearly marks Mogharrabi

28. Id. at 430-31 (quoting Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1250 (5th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987)).
29. Id. at 431 n.11 (quoting In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 221 (B.I.A.
1985)).
30. Cf. Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science
Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 62-64 (1998) (noting
how stereotypes of women as "emotional," not rational, actors figure in the confusion of subjectivity and objectivity in women's self-defense cases).
31. 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
32. Id. at 445.
33.

Id.
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as precedent for a dynamic approach. So does the B.I.A.'s approving citation of the Ninth Circuit's observation in CardozaFonseca that the absence of a corroboration requirement does
not render the standard for asylum "wholly subjective [because] 'objective facts . . . [can be] established through
34
the credible and persuasive testimony of the applicant.'
Despite the force of its holding and rationale, however,
traces of formalism linger in Mogharrabi'slanguage, ready for
resuscitation on a later day. Particularly notable is what the
B.I.A. did not say. The B.I.A., having noted that an asylumseeker's testimony is not "wholly subjective," did not extend its
deconstruction of objectivity by acknowledging bias in evidence
relied on by the INS, such as State Department reports.3 5 Together with its favorable citation of an appellate opinion that
distinguished refugee testimony from "corroborative objective
evidence, "36 and its warning that the refugee would be required
to produce all obtainable corroboration, the B.I.A.'s failure to
expressly acknowledge State Department bias again reinforced
the formalist message by marginalizing refugee testimony as a
dangerous exception to orderly adjudication.
The lingering pull of formalism in this rhetoric recently
has become clear as formalists have staged a counterattack on
behalf of rigid corroboration requirements. The formalist push
starts with the Mogharrabi language requiring corroboration
when such corroboration is obtainable.3 ' The problem with this

34. Id. at 444 (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th
Cir. 1985), affd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
35. Courts, as well as commentators, have criticized the State Department
on this basis. See, e.g., Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1062-63 (2d Cir. 1976);
Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968) (asserting that State Department opinions on particular asylum claims "do not carry the guarantees of
reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank, but official,
discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is not always compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous diplomatic relations"). For a
comprehensive list of critiques of the State Department role in asylum adjudication, see sources cited supra note 4, and ANKER, supra note 2, at 110 n.128.
36. See Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 443 (quoting Carvajal-Munoz v. INS,
743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)) (declining to preclude use of refugee testimony
as sole basis for asylum grant, while noting that generally such testimony "will be
insufficient to meet the evidentiary burden").
37. See id. at 445.
38. See, e.g., In re M-D-, Interim Dec. No. 3339 at 5-6 & n.1 (B.I.A. 1998)
(holding that Mauritanian asylum-seeker's failure to produce identity card from
refugee camp, despite United Nations' letter stating that cards were frequently
unavailable to former camp resident, justified the denial of asylum).
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seemingly unexceptionable requirement is that asylum adjudicators tend to view all corroboration as "readily obtainable."
Evidence in writing from other countries, which Mogharrabi
recognized can be impossible to procure, is now commonly expected in Immigration Court. The result is that corroboration
requirements are swallowing up9 the space that Mogharrabi
carved out for refugee narratives.
B. The Jurisprudenceof Impatience: Changed Country
Conditions and Asylum Adjudication
The trend toward formalism in proof of asylum, with its
threat to both Mogharrabi and Cardoza-Fonseca,parallels the
evolving law of changed country conditions. Many recent decisions defer mechanically to State Department conclusions citing the results of single elections or changes in law "on the
books" as proof that refugees have nothing to fear.4" Indeed,
recent cases, in a headlong rush to judgment, frequently discount the adverse information about country conditions, which
the State Department itself includes in its reports.4 1 This hyper-deferential approach, constituting a kind of jurisprudence
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1496 (1999). Regulations recently proposed by the Department of Justice
on the issues of changed country conditions and countrywide persecution (the requirement that asylum-seekers prove that they face a well-founded fear of persecution not just in their own town, city, or region, but throughout their country of
origin), do little to address substantive flaws in the treatment of transitions to
democracy under changed conditions doctrine, or the clash between the doctrine
and leading cases like Cardoza-Fonsecaand Mogharrabi adopting a flexible approach to asylum procedure. See New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum
and Withholding of Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
pt. 208) (proposed June 11, 1998). These draft regulations do incorporate elements of the dynamic approach in that they allow an Immigration Judge to consider in the exercise of discretion whether the asylum-seeker would undergo substantial hardship if she were forced to return to her country of origin. Hardship
can involve factors unrelated to persecution on the basis of the five grounds which
render a refugee eligible for asylum: race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
and membership in a particular social group. Hardship under the proposed
regulations might include, for example, separation from family in the United
States. Many refugees without such equities will not be assisted by the new
regulations, however, and will continue to be deported because of a formalistic
view of changed country conditions that looks to the results of a single election,
shifts in government officials, or revisions to law "on the books" as adequate indicia of democratic transition.
41. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Neyra v. INS, 122 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1997),
amended by 133 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1998).
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of impatience, substantially undercuts the protections created
by Cardoza-Fonsecaand Mogharrabi.
1. Asylum Procedure and Changed Country
Conditions
A simple "road map" of procedure in changed country conditions cases aids understanding of the challenge to values underlying asylum law. Generally, if an asylum-seeker has not
suffered what the tribunal deems to be past persecution, the
burden of proof remains with him to show he will be persecuted
in the future if he returns to his country of origin.42 This burden encompasses the obligation to show that country conditions
have not changed in a manner material to his asylum claim.43
If an asylum-seeker has proven past persecution," the burden
shifts to the government to show that conditions have changed.
Finally, if the asylum-seeker demonstrates "severe and atrocious" persecution, she may be granted asylum as a matter of
discretion even if there is little risk under the ten-percent Cardoza-Fonseca standard that she will be persecuted if she returns.4 5 The trend in proof of changed country conditions is to
require greater specificity and certainty of the asylum-seeker,
and less specificity and certainty of the government. The problem is that this trend ignores the values underlying crucial
precedents such as Cardoza-Fonsecaand Mogharrabi.
2.

Formalism and the Changed Country Conditions
Doctrine

The erosion of Cardoza-Fonsecaand Mogharrabi, and the
ascendancy of deference to the State Department are evident in
most recent decisions on changed country conditions. These
decisions ignore the fact that the State Department follows criteria much less centered on the refugee's circumstances than
the ten-percent standard for a well-founded fear of persecution

42. See, e.g., ANKER, supra note 2, at 44-47.
43. See id.
44. Case law is mixed on exactly what constitutes past persecution, but the
standard definition of persecution includes harm to life or liberty, on account of
the five enumerated grounds for asylum. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439

(B.I.A. 1987).
45.

See In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (B.I.A. 1989).
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set out in Cardoza-Fonseca. Moreover, the formalists' deference to the State Department overrules Mogharrabi sub silentio. In effect, this deference allows State Department conclusions, even those contradicted by facts within the State
Department's own reports, to outweigh all but the most copiously corroborated refugee testimony.46 The result is a jurisprudence of impatience-one that ignores the complex dynamic
of governmental transitions and the persistent power of societal discrimination in favor of quick determinations based on
State Department reports.
The force of the formalist trend, as well as a superficial
analysis of changed country conditions, emerges clearly in recent decisions on the troubled transition from Communist dictatorship to democracy in Romania.4" Two cases found substantial evidence supporting B.I.A. denials of asylum on
grounds of changed country conditions to asylum-seekers who
concededly suffered significant past persecution, including serious beatings.4" In each case, the court deferred to State De46. The clearest expression of the formalist approach is the view that agencies can take administrative notice of changed country conditions. Administrative
See
notice is appropriate where facts are "commonly acknowledged."
Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding administrative
notice of changed country conditions in asylum claims). Facts susceptible to administrative notice do not require evidentiary proof through a hearing by a trier of
fact. An appellate tribunal can take administrative notice without a remand to a
fact finder, even if the facts so noticed defeat an otherwise valid asylum claim.
Some courts have gone further, holding that the B.I.A., before taking notice, need
not provide the asylum-seeker with an opportunity to argue that notice is inappropriate. Compare id. (holding that opportunity after notice has been taken to
seek discretionary re-opening of case is sufficient under the Refugee Act and the
due process clause) with Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992)
(requiring greater opportunity for asylum-seeker to be heard prior to notice determination). For analysis of administrative notice in the asylum context, see
Katherine J. Strandburg, Official Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum Adjudication:Lessons from InternationalRefugee Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
45; Vincent A. Tome, Note, Administrative Notice of Changed Country Conditions
in Asylum Adjudication, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411 (1994). Even if tribunals do not take administrative notice, however, the problem of an adequate
substantive standard for finding changed country conditions remains. See
Lorisme v. INS, 129 F.3d 1441, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that B.I.A. did not
take administrative notice, but nevertheless upholding on substantial evidence
grounds the B.I.A-'s finding of changed conditions in Haiti).
47. For evidence of the continued turbulence in Romania, see Romanian
Miners Clash With Police, Leaving 130 Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at A3,
and discussion infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
48. See Petre v. INS, No. 97-70945, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2005, at *1 (9th
Cir. Feb. 3, 1999); Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1998). The date of the
Petre decision suggests that information about the latest symptom of turbulence
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partment conclusions on "sweeping changes" in Romania, ignoring contrary evidence that clearly satisfied CardozaFonseca'sten-percent standard.49
Boiled down to its essence, the State Department position
on Romanian asylum claims consists of two premises unsupportable on the law or facts. First is the formalistic view that
conditions have changed materially because the Romanian national government now merely tolerates persecution at the local level, instead of engaging in persecution itself. This view
ignores black-letter asylum law, which states that persecution
by forces the government is "unable or unwilling to control"
meets the statutory standard." Second is the shifting of responsibility to victims of persecution, who are advised by the
State Department to protect themselves "'by recourse to the
nascent democratic legal structures rather than by recourse to
seeking political asylum abroad."'5 1 On this view, Romanian
asylum-seekers are apparently indulging in unreasonable fear
if they worry that, following decades of dictatorship, "nascent"
structures cannot bear the heavy burden of deterring and redressing persecution.5 2
in Romania was available, but was ignored by the court. See Romanian Miners
Clash With Police, supra note 47. A third Ninth Circuit case reverses the B.I.A.'s
decision on changed country conditions. See Misca v. INS, No. 97-70909, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 786, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1999). Under the new statutory restrictions on judicial review of B.I.A. asylum decisions, however, the B.I.A.'s denial of asylum in this case may well have been final. The B.I.A. has also ruled for
a Romanian refugee in a recent case in which the St. Thomas University School of
Law Immigration Clinic provided representation. See In re T-P-, No. A74 648 334
(B.I.A. Nov. 3, 1998). A 3-1 record at the B.I.A. against Romanian refugees on basically identical facts suggests, at best, that the B.I.A. must do more to ensure
consistency in its changed country conditions analysis.
49. For an example of the circular reasoning at work in these cases, see
Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1081 (asserting that the State Department is "'the most appropriate and perhaps the best resource' for 'information on political situations in
foreign nations.' This makes sense because this inquiry is directly within the expertise of the Department of State" (citation omitted)).
50. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222.
51. Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1082 n.2 (citing the United States's State Department's annual Country Report on Romania).
52. Cf. Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Gramatikov v.
INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997)) (finding, in a case involving repeated
threats and physical attacks suffered by petitioner because of his opposition to
Communist influence in Lithuania, that B.I.A. erred by placing excessive reliance
on State Department opinion, particularly given the "perennial concern that the
[State] Department softpedals human rights violations by countries that the
United States wants to have good relations with").
The new formalism in changed country conditions jurisprudence goes well beyond Eastern Europe. Cf. Lorisme v. INS, 129 F.3d 1441, 1444 (11th Cir. 1997)
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The analytical approach underlying these formalistic decisions oversimplifies the complex trajectory of transitions from
dictatorship to democracy. The flaws of this approach are clear
in cases involving countries that endure multiple regime
changes, such as Afghanistan. The formalistic view considers
such regime changes as discrete events, rather than parts of an
ongoing process. Acting on this view in a recent Afghanistan
case,53 the B.I.A. held that an asylum-seeker who has demonstrated a well-founded fear of one regime must shoulder the
burden of proving this fear all over again if the regime changes.
At first blush, the B.I.A.'s logic seems impeccable: a new
regime will presumably have both new enemies and new
friends, and one might suppose that foes of the former regime
will be friends of the new. As we discuss in greater depth in
the next Part of this article, however, revolution is often a dynamic process that ultimately consumes its own.54 Those at the
forefront of an attack on an old regime, as in the French and
Russian Revolutions or even the Russian transition out of
Communism, may be the most, not least, likely targets of the
new regime. 55 Recent Afghani history has echoed this phe(relying largely on a State Department profile in finding that country conditions

in Haiti have changed sufficiently to allow deportation of a Haitian asylumseeker, based on the United States-led multinational force's intervention in 1994,
which displaced the military coup regime that had toppled the democratically
elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide). For a more dynamic approach, see
Fergiste v. INS, 138 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1998) (requiring specific findings fiom
immigration judges regarding both petitioner's evidence rebutting State Depart-

ment report, and effect of possible pro-democratic changes on petitioner's particular fear of persecution).

While the First Circuit in Fergiste takes a more dynamic view of the changed
conditions doctrine, the drastic curtailing of judicial review under cases started

after the effective date of the 1996 Immigration Act will remove this check on the
B.I.A. For a hint of the deference that courts will accord the B.I.A. under the new
judicial review provisions, see Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1082-1083 (in case involving
severe, repeated beatings suffered by the petitioner and his family because of

their opposition to Romanian dictatorship, the court upheld the B.I.A.'s decision
that the beatings were not sufficiently "'severe or atrocious'" to justify humani-

tarian grant of asylum, reasoning that the B.I.A. "heard the claim, considered the
evidence, and decided against Marcu. No more was required").
53.

See In re N-M-A-, Interim Dec. No. 3368 at 3 (B.I.A. Oct. 21, 1998).

54.

See JEFFREY C. ISAAC, ARENDT, CAMUS, AND MODERN REBELLION 133

(1992) (noting the propensity of revolutionaries to kill each other with "selfdevouring zeal").
55.

See Adam Michnik, A Death in St. Petersburg,N.Y. REV. BOOKS., Jan.

14, 1999, at 4 (describing how, in the former Soviet Union, a "dissident and former
political prisoner, chosen as president of Georgia, became an authoritarian despot,

who started to put in prison his former friends from the democratic opposition");
cf. ARENDT, supra note 9, at 51-52 (discussing how Robespierre "liquidated" Dan-
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nomenon, veering from Soviet domination contested by a strong
Islamic resistance, to warlords fighting each other for control,
to an ascending force of Islamic fundamentalists-the Taliban-characterized by an austere patriarchy, intolerance, and
fratricidal violence among erstwhile Islamic resistance colleagues.
The B.I.A.'s orderly account of discrete regime
changes, each accompanied by its own brand-new burden of
proof for the refugee, seems at best irrelevant, and at worst
downright Kafkaesque.
The new formalism's inability to capture the dialectic of
continuity and change in political and social transitions is most
glaring in the area of deep-seated ethnic or religious discrimination.5" The subordination of particular groups often depends
less on formal government action than on a complex network of
practices and institutions, shaped by "all-pervasive influences
and convictions ...tacitly and inarticulately shared."57 These

practices and institutions perpetuate subordination for decades
and even centuries. Yet formalist decisions treat societal discrimination as, at best, a mild irritant for returning refugees,
effectively neutralized by changes in official faces, laws, and
policy.
The conflict with Cardoza-Fonseca and Mogharrabi posed
by such a view is manifest in Mikhailevitch v. INS.58 In Mikhailevitch, the Sixth Circuit upheld a B.I.A. decision finding
conditions sufficiently changed in Belarus, a former Soviet Republic,59 to permit the deportation of Roman Catholics who had
been persecuted during the Soviet era because of their religion.
The State Department advisory to the Immigration Court regarding the case touted improvements in the climate for Roman Catholics in Belarus. It acknowledged, however, that the
ton in the French Revolution, creating a template that the Russian Communists
chose to follow, because they believed that "a revolution would take its course in a
sequence of revolutions, or that the open enemy was followed by the hidden enemy ...or that a revolution would split into two extreme factions").
56. Here, the new draft regulations compound the problem. See Executive
Office for Immigration Review, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (1998). They make countrywide persecution harder to prove, paradoxically, for those asylum-seekers whose
persecution stems from nongovernmental persecution.
57.

HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 314 (1973).

58. 146 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 1998).
59. For a less optimistic perspective on Belarus, see Risky Business in Belarus, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 22, 1999, at A20, describing how Belarus's dictator, "who
makes no secret of his admiration for Stalin," persecutes virtually anyone he perceives as a threat, including political opponents, journalists, human rights activists, and entrepreneurs. Id.
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President of Belarus had questioned the loyalty of Roman
Catholics, that the government had placed limits on the activities of foreign Catholic priests, many of whom are from Poland,
a historic rival of Belarus, and that these factors "do not contribute to a climate of ethnic and religious tolerance." ° Given
the history of genocide as a sequel to imputations of disloyalty
to particular groups, 6 ' it seems clear, based on the adverse
country information in the State Department's own advisory,
that the asylum claimant had proven under Cardoza-Fonseca
that there was at least a one-in-ten chance that he would experience persecution if he was forced to return. Yet, the court did
not even address the impact of the adverse country information
in its legal analysis.62 Instead, the court deferred blandly to
the State Department's conclusion that the history of persecution in Belarus was exactly that-mere "history"-despite the
State Department's own acknowledgment of the uncertain current "climate" for Roman Catholics.
The inadequacy of current approaches to societal discrimination in changed country conditions jurisprudence, particularly at the B.I.A. level, is also manifest in recent decisions on
anti-Semitism in the former Soviet republics. The Ninth Circuit, operating under the old judicial review provisions of the
Refugee Act, recently reversed the B.I.A. in a case concerning a
Ukrainian citizen of Jewish heritage who documented a harrowing history of mental, emotional, and physical torture at the
hands of anti-Semitic Ukrainian nationalists. 64 The petitioner
had described in detail a chain of frightening encounters, including repeated beatings, anti-Semitic phone calls and notes,
and an episode in which she was tied to a chair while her assailants placed a noose around her neck.6 5 The B.I.A. fully
credited the petitioner's testimony, including testimony that
60. Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 387. The State Department advisory, consistent with the dynamic approach, inquired into the issue of redress for past
wrongs, noting that many Church buildings confiscated by the Soviet regime had
been returned. This measure of redress is an important positive sign regarding
changed conditions. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. The question
under Cardoza-Fonseca,however, is whether this positive sign should cancel out
the ominous omens involving questioning the loyalty of Roman Catholics, given
the history of persecution of this group.
61.

See ARENDT, supra note 57.

62.
63.
64.
65.

See Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390.
See id. at 387.
See Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1042.
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the Ukrainian police and courts had refused to offer redress for
this wrongdoing or hold the wrongdoers accountable in any
way. 6 Yet the B.I.A. ruled that the petitioner had not demon-

strated either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution.67 The B.I.A. relied on the State Department's account of formal changes in the Ukraine, including the government's admirable abandonment of anti-Semitism as official
policy and68 its pious pronouncements about the ills of antiSemitism.
In essence, asylum tribunals' deference to the State Department results in resolving uncertainty against the asylumseeker, thereby creating a de facto "likelihood of persecution"
standard, in direct contravention of Cardoza-Fonseca. The only
way for the asylum-seeker to meet this heavier burden is to
produce a "smoking gun"-an affidavit from his persecutors

66. See id. at 1045.
67. See id. at 1044.
68. See id. at 1041; cf In re O-Z & I-Z, Interim Dec. No. 3346 (B.I.A. Apr. 2,
1998) (describing how a B.I.A. panel with two frequent dissenters from B.I.A. en
banc decisions found a lack of changed conditions in Ukraine case reflecting comparable pattern of beatings and harassment); Michael Wines, Struggling Ukraine
Teeters Between East and West, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al (discussing continued uncertainty in Ukraine). Another case that discounts the continuing impact of anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union is Maliavkina v. INS, No. 97-.
2366, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4168 (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 1998). In Maliavkina, the
court affirmed the B.I.A.'s denial of asylum to a Latvian Jew whose knee had been
broken by men shouting anti-Semitic slurs. The Court relied on a State Department report that characterized the situation of the Jewish community in Latvia
as "generally tranquil." See id. at *9. In deferring to the State Department's rosy
assessment of post-Communist Latvia, the court discounted both the State Department's own report of "some manifestations of anti-Semitism such as destruction of a synagogue ... and desecration of cemeteries," and the asylum seeker's
submission of news articles that describe continuing anti-Semitism and "some
open support for Nazism." Id. at *8. The court cited the State Department's view
that "official discrimination against Jews... ended with the end of Communist
rule in 1991." Id. at 8. Unfortunately, history reveals that anti-Semitism in Latvia required no Communist coercion. During World War II, for example, as the
German invasion of the Soviet Union left the Communists in disarray, Latvians
actively embraced the Nazi's genocidal program. The contemporaneous report of
a Nazi officer notes that Latvian Jews were, as of December 1941, either forced
into work camps "or shot by the Latvians.... They [the Latvians] hate the Jews
in particular. From the time of liberation [i.e., Nazi occupation] they have participated very amply in the extermination of these parasites." CHRISTOPHER R.
BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL
SOLUTION IN POLAND 44 (rev. ed. 1998). The experiences during World War II of

my mother, a Holocaust survivor, echo this account. See Margulies, supra note 5,
at 138. The court in Maliavkina, however, seemed to view history as irrelevant.
Maliavkina, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4168.
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stating what they intend to do to him if he returns. Persecutors are curiously unwilling to produce such corroboration for
the refugee, which is why Mogharrabiholds that corroboration
is not necessarily required. The formalist view thus undermines both Mogharrabiand Cardoza-Fonseca,and with them,
the structure of refugee protection.69
II.

THE DYNAMIC VIEW OF TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION

The formalist model of changed country conditions jurisprudence would be troubling enough if all it did were undermine precedent like Mogharrabi and Cardoza-Fonseca. Unfortunately, the failings of the model do not end there. The
formalism of the changed country conditions doctrine also
adopts a conception of democratic transition and consolidation,

which is radically at odds with both empirical and theoretical
research.7"
A substantial body of literature has developed to make
sense of the transitions throughout the world. Considering
changes in regimes in regions as disparate as Eastern and
Southern Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa,
scholars, while conceding the distinctive ethos of each of these
areas, have developed dynamic models to identify crucial elements in the transition to democracy. 7' These dynamic models
recognize that change is fluid, complex, and unpredictable. As
69. A measure of the degree to which changed country conditions makes
asylum adjudication into an exercise in impatience is the rudeness, hostility, and
intimidation that Immigration Judges often display in hearing cases raising these
issues. Cf. Garrovillas v. INS, 156 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 1998) (observing
that, "[t]hroughout the proceedings, the IJ acted with impatience and hostility
toward Garrovillas, bullying and haranguing him from the inception of the hearing to its conclusion"); Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 392 (acknowledging that the IJ
'may have been 'brusque,' and perhaps could have achieved his objective in a
more courteous manner"). In my experience with the St. Thomas School of Law
Immigration Clinic in Miami, dealing with changed conditions cases involving
Haitians, Eastern Europeans, and others, IJs in these cases more than others
tend to be peremptory and directive, hindering rather than facilitating the asylum-seeker's testimony.
70. I address empirical and theoretical perspective on regime change in this
section, and concrete applications of this literature, as well as current events, to
individual countries in the concluding Parts.
71. See sources cited supra note 9. These models do not necessarily view all
the features of United States-style democracy, particularly its tolerance of high
degrees of income inequality, as a template for democracy across the globe. See
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 470 (1995) (book review); Chua, supra note 9.
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one commentator has pointed out, "democratic evolution is
[not] a steady process that is homogeneous over time ....
Temporal discontinuity. .. is implicit." 2 Indeed, this literature explicitly borrows from conceptions of regime change developed over the centuries in political philosophy by civic humanist theorists, students of the rise and fall of republics who
viewed such change not as an act of God or a result dictated by
structural forces, but instead as the "contingent product of human collective action."73 Regimes can move from despotism to
democracy, or just as readily travel in the opposite direction.7 4
The notion of human collective action not only encompasses what is necessary about establishing and maintaining
democracy, but also, in broader terms, what is good about it.
The transition theorists and the civic humanists believe that
human beings fulfill themselves when they express themselves

72. Dankwart A. Rostow, Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic
Model, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 67.
73. Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, The Conceptual Travels of
Transitologists and Consolidogists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to
Go?, 53 SLAVIC REV. 173, 174 (1994).
74. See id. Schmitter and Karl quote Machiavelli on the uncertainty of
change:
There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success,
nor more dangerous to administer than to introduce a new system of
things: for he who introduces it has all those who profit from the old system as his enemies and he has only lukewarm allies in all those who
might profit from the new system.
Id. (quoting NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, VI). Machiavelli continues his
analysis by observing that the "lukewarmness" of allies of change arises "partly
from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour." NICCOLO
MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 21 (Modern Library ed., 1950). The importance of the
principle of legal redress for abuses perpetrated by the old regime, explored infra
notes 90-96 and accompanying text, compare MINOW, supra note 9, lies in large
part in alleviating this paralyzing fear. Students of legal redress for human
rights abuse tend to cite the twentieth century's great civic humanist, Hannah
Arendt, who authored the most famous study of legal action against perpetrators
of crimes against humanity. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A
REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963), cited in, e.g., MINOW, supra note 9, at
47, 48; OSIEL, supra note 9, at 17 n.23. Arendt took as one of her crucial themes
the contingency of political change-both movement from oppression toward democracy, and what, after all, in the first half of the twentieth century, seemed a
far more salient trend-the transition toward totalitarianism. Some of Arendt's
most trenchant analysis was reserved for transitions, such as those in the French
and Russian Revolutions, in which action against oppression consumed its own
most prominent actors, or led to an even greater source of oppression-another
distinguishing mark of the contingency of human action in this realm. See
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION, supra note 9; see also discussion supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text (discussing self-consuming character of many revolutions).
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in concert on matters regarding the well-being of the community. 5 This expression need not be explicitly political at all
times, or even most of the time; expression is found along a
continuum that by turns can be cultural, familial, or aesthetic.
This expression is itself dynamic, because no mechanical formula-no shorthand of class, race, or economic interest-can
conclusively determine how people speak and act as they engage with the speech and action of others. Regimes must provide for this dynamic element by permitting political expression and providing avenues for changing a particular
government that incurs popular dissatisfaction. Regimes that
preclude such a continuum of expression, or tolerate its preclusion by one group of constituents acting against another, cast
doubt on their claims as democracies. For the dynamic to become and remain democratic, therefore, the spontaneity of indignation that galvanizes political action must mingle with
memory, particularly the memory of an abiding commitment to
respect for all groups within society. Preserving that commitment in perilous times, such as the times of revolution and
despotism known and feared by all asylum-seekers, must be
viewed as a crucial responsibility of government and the people.
While there is no single template for democracy,76 we can
create an operating definition that views democracy as both
ensuring input from constituents and offering protections
against overreaching by government and by powerful private
groups. The three central elements advanced by the transition
theorists and the civic humanists for realizing this definition
are: 1) Institutional Repertoire; 2) Inclusion; and 3) Redress. I
address each in turn in the following paragraphs. The absence
of any of these should lend substantial credibility to an asylum
seeker's claim of a well-founded fear of persecution.

75. Cf O'Donnell, supra note 9, at 113 (identifying the civic humanist notion
that "the discharge of public duties is an ennobling activity" as central to maintenance of democracy, and asserting that "dedication to the public good.., demands
and nurtures the highest virtues").
76. Cf David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and InternationalGovernance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (cautioning against
rigid methodology in international studies).
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A. InstitutionalRepertoire
Because both the transition theorists and the civic humanists view change as the product of collective human action,
the manner in which humans organize themselves is of crucial
concern. What is most crucial from a transition perspective,
and therefore important to the asylum-seeker contemplating a
return to her country of origin, is the entire repertoire of institutions available in that country. A broad spectrum of organizations and groups, with varying degrees of formality in their
composition, structure, and purpose, is the best guarantee of
safety for the asylum-seeker, and of success in democratic transitions.
A repertoire of institutions is important because a single
dominant institution ultimately will supplant diversity with an
oppressive homogeneity." Elections are the institution most
readily examined by those of the formalist stripe. They are
large-scale events, publicized in the international media, and
examined up close by teams of international observers.7 8 Without a repertoire of institutions, including an independent judiciary and the array of more or less formalized organizations
commonly referred to as "civil society," elections can allow an
ambitious leader or cadre of leaders formed into a political
party to manipulate mass opinion.7 9 That is one recipe for totalitarianism and terror in the twentieth century.
77.

See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RELUCTANT MODERNISM OF HANNAH ARENDT

162 (1996) (arguing that, in the French Revolution, "alliance between the people
and the Jacobins led to the replacement of political diversity by national unity, led
to an ideology of homogenization whereby the people, the object of compassion and
manipulation, became a mythical instance to which ultimate appeal was
made .... [U]nity dominated over diversity and plurality").
78. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, 7 J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996, at 34, 45 ("Fair elections are the main, if not the only,
characteristic that certifies countries as democratic before other governments and
international opinion."). One can read some transition scholars, such as Samuel
Huntington, as insisting, for some purposes at least, on the existence of free and
fair elections as the principal criterion for democracy.
See SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH

CENTURY 9 (1991) ("Elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy,
the inescapable sine qua non."). Yet these scholars also readily concede that majority rule, even if embodied in elections, does not necessarily resolve vital questions about the inclusion of minorities. See Samuel Huntington, Democracy's
Third Wave, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 129, 131-32 (discussing the plight of ethnic minorities in the former Soviet Union).
79. Cf O'Donnell, supra note 78, at 44 (noting that "a caesaristic, plebiscitarian executive.., once elected sees itself as empowered to govern the country as
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Civil society is a crucial factor in the repertoire of institutions that the formalist view, with its emphasis on elections,
neglects. Civil society, which involves associations of persons
working to better their community, region, or country, promotes the participation transition theorists and civic humanists view as necessary for democracy.8 ° Civil society is useful
both in counterbalancing the state and in complementing it.
For example, groups can seek to vindicate rights and interests
provided for under formal laws, but underenforced by the state.
Groups can provide services to constituencies that the state
does not serve efficiently or equitably, tempering class conflict
and resentment. Groups can also stand fast against state and
private overreaching, registering protest through strikes, demonstrations, and support of legal challenges.8 ' In this way, associations of civil society can push the state to vindicate the
promises of freedom and equality that are formally present in
its founding documents, but are frequently absent in practice.8 2
Civil society alone is not the answer, however. This is why
a repertoire of institutions that includes more formal, traditional political institutions-such as legislatures and administrative agencies-is vital. Civil society offers a forum for citizens to express their views, but it lacks the overarching
deliberative structures necessary for mediating conflicts, such
as the role played by the United States Senate when it funcit deems fit. Reinforced by the urgencies of severe socioeconomic crises and consonant with old volkisch... congress, the judiciary, and various state agencies of
control are seen as hindrances ....).
80. See LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 9, at 7-9; Gerald Clarke, NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World, 46
POL. STUD. 36, 41 (1998); Schmitter & Karl, supra note 9, at 7-8.
81. See Jan Kubik, Institutionalizationof Protest During Democratic Consolidation in Central Europe, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SOCIETY: CONTENTIOUS
POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY 131 (David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow eds., 1998);
cf.RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST

APARTHEID, 1980-1994 11 (1995) ("Ever since the founding of the ACLU and
NAACP... social movements have mobilized law proactively to challenge the

state and, less often, private adversaries.").
82. Cf. Clarke, supra note 80, at 41-42 (quoting H. Sethi, Some Notes on Micro-Struggles: NGO's and the State, ASIAN EXCHANGE 75 (May 1993) (observing
that "'formal democracy, where it exists, [is] a necessary but insufficient condition

in the long haul to social transformation'")). This stubborn clinging to the promise
of a founding narrative of equality, in the face of repeated disappointments in the
realm of formal law and politics, was a cardinal theme for Frederick Douglass and

the American abolitionists, and a century later for the civil rights movement. See
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987).
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tions well.8 3 Without strong political institutions, civil society
dissolves into Babel, or coalesces into a juggernaut that tramples on the rule of law and impinges on the rights of those perceived as different.84 Civil and political institutions play comin
functioning
roles
not
dichotomous,
plementary,
8
5
democracies.
Finally, in a related point, a dynamic conception recognizes
that institutions must be able to act as a formal or informal
check on each others' excesses. For example, separation of
powers-or what the transition scholar Guillermo O'Donnell
calls "horizontal accountability" among the coordinate branches
of government-may be written into the new regime's constitution, but may be impossible to realize in practice because of
jockeying among factions within those branches. As a result,
laws become "instruments in ...power plays,"86 not norms for
institutional dialogue. This situation, too, is ripe for demo-

83. See LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 9, at 10 ("Institutional routinization, intermediaries, and compromise within politics are often spoken of pejoratively [in
civil society] ...[but] each of the above terms refers to an indispensable practice
of political society in a consolidated democracy."); cf.Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: A New Architecture for Freedom, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 129 (1993) (analyzing
federalism as a way of introducing checks and balances to curb ethnic strife in
democratic transitions).
84. It is sobering to note here that the groups associated with the rise of totalitarianism in this century-Nazis, Fascists, and Communists-all started as
associations in civil society. See ARENDT, supra note 9; see also LINZ & STEPAN,
supra note 9, at 10 (stating that "many civil society leaders view with moral antipathy 'internal conflict' and 'division' within the democratic forces," instead of
recognizing these elements as necessary elements of democracy); David Rieff, The
False Dawn of Civil Society, THE NATION, Feb. 22, 1999, at 11, 14 (arguing that
civil society, compared with more traditional political institutions, is "more likely
to be wracked by divisions based on region and the self-interest of... single issue
groups"); cf Aili Mari Tripp, Expanding 'Civil Society': Women and PoliticalSpace
in Contemporary Uganda, 36 COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL., July 1998, at 84, 85
(1998) (discussing civil society as a traditional male preserve). Similarly, groups'
methods of organization and implementation require scrutiny. Non-violent means
will often enhance participation and civic discourse. As the Nazis, Fascists, and
Communists knew, violence will chill and distort discourse, as well as put pressure on democratic processes. Cf Schmitter & Karl, supra note 9, at 7-8 (discussing effects of violence).
85. See LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 9, at 8-9 ("[T]o consolidate democracy, it
is important to stress not only the distinctiveness of civil society and political society, but also their complementarity."); Tripp, supra note 84, at 105 (noting importance of "complementarity ...of political reform along many dimensions that
range from changes at the national level to changes in people's daily lives").
86. See O'Donnell, supra note 9, at 120.
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cratic erosion," rendering the asylum-seeker's prospects perilous upon her return.
B. Inclusion
As our discussion on the need for diversity in civil society
demonstrates, inclusion is also a central value in the consolidation of democracy. Singling out a group for special disadvantages, whether express or tacit, de jure or de facto, governmentally- or privately-imposed, hollows out democracy at its core of
equal membership and participation.8 8 Ethnic strife, markedly
present in much of Eastern Europe 89 and parts of Africa, for
example, is a red flag of caution to asylum-seekers considering
return to their countries of origin. 90 Much of this strife, with its
genocidal consequences, started not as governmental action but
rather as activity by private groups setting up their own bastions of "ethnic purity." In this area, as in others, the quality of
action and discourse among private actors is at least as important to the dynamic of democracy as the conduct of public officials according to express public policy.
In addition to ethnic strife, exclusion based on criteria such
as socioeconomic status and gender threatens democracy and
returning asylum-seekers. Some semblance of socioeconomic
equity is important because inequality in this sphere breeds
popular resentment, which foments demagoguery and ultimately dictatorship, either by self-styled representatives of the

87.

See Schedler, supra note 9, at 97 (citing Guillermo O'Donnell, Transi-

tions, Continuities, and Paradoxes, in ISSUES IN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION:

17, 19,
33 (Scott Mainwaring et al. eds., 1992) (describing causes of the "slow death" of
democracy)).
88. Hannah Arendt as usual put the matter starkly. See ARENDT, supra
note 9, at 65 (querying whether "the goodness of [the United States]... did not
depend to a considerable degree upon black labor and black misery").
89. Cf. Huntington, supra note 78, at 131-32 ("Democratic development in
most of the Soviet republics ...is greatly complicated by their ethnic heterogeneity and the unwillingness of the dominant nationality to allow equal rights to ethnic minorities .... [The issue] may take years if not decades to resolve . . .");
Terry Lynn Karl & Philippe C. Schmitter, From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologistsor Students of Postcommunism?, 54 SLAVIC REV.
965, 972 (1995) (discussing centrality of ethnic strife for countries seeking transition out of dictatorship).
90. The oppression of indigenous people throughout the world is another
part of this problem. See W. Michael Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights in
InternationalAdjudication, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 350 (1995).
THE NEW SOUTH AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
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downtrodden, as in discredited Communist totalitarian regimes, or by representatives of the plutocracy, desperate to
preserve or expand their power. 9 ' For asylum-seekers fleeing
persecution based on gender, the continuing salience of patriarchal customary practices such as female genital cutting, enforced often extra-governmentally by families, clans, and villages, is a profound concern that changes in "law on the books"
do little to alleviate.92
C. Redress
Access to power and resources for all groups in the social
realm develops in tandem with equality of access to legal institutions."
Legal institutions strong enough to uphold the
claims of the, weak against the powerful are a bulwark of democracy. By the same token, legal institutions that work only
when they are not doing any heavy lifting become a weapon for
enforcing oppression, ratifying governmental overreaching, and
reinforcing socioeconomic inequality.
Asylum-seekers are profoundly concerned about this issue
because they wish to have the ability, even if they do not exercise it, to seek redress against their persecutors. The legal system's ability to offer such redress is an acid test for democratic
consolidation, and for an asylum-seeker's safety in her country
of origin. If human rights abusers act with impunity, a powerful negative message issues about both safety and democracy.
91. See Philippe C. Schmitter, The Consolidation of PoliticalDemocracies:
Processes,Rhythms, Sequences and Types, in TRANSITIONS To DEMOCRACY, supra
note 9, at 567 (discussing the importance of eliminating "social inequalities" and
"concentrations of private economic power"); O'Donnell, supra note 78, at 45. Indeed, the dynamic conception reveals that even what constitutes reform may be
subject to debate and cross purposes. For example, market reforms undertaken in
conjunction with democratization may exacerbate ethnic rivalries, including resentment of ethnic "haves" by ethnic "have-nots", thereby infecting political discourse and threatening democratic institutions. See Chua, supra note 9.
92. See Tripp, supra note 84, at 88 (noting informal barriers placed in the
way of women's participation in governance, including men at council meetings
deciding that "women should not bother attending the meetings since it interrupted their domestic chores").
93. See O'Donnell, supra note 78, at 45 (noting many states with ostensibly
democratic elections still deprive people of rights and participation, citing examples including "[tihe rights of battered women to sue their husbands and of peasants to obtain a fair trial against their landlords, the inviolability of domiciles in
poor neighborhoods, and in general the right of the poor and various minorities to
decent treatment and fair access to public agencies and courts").

20001

FUTURE OF ASYLUM LAW

First, the survivor's society learns that it need not respect the
survivor of abuse, or accord her membership in the community.
Second, for the survivor, as well as all those complicitous in
this denial of membership in society, the temporal horizon of
democracy-the ability to extend the memory of democratic
commitments into the future-shrinks alarmingly.94 When the
preservation of democracy seems like a long shot, incentives to
participate shrivel up, and the field is left to eager practitioners
of the rhetoric of exclusion.
Since redress is so crucial, it is unfortunate that punishing
human rights violators often seems like an arduous task, as the
recent examples of Haiti, Argentina, Chile, and present-day
Cambodia demonstrate.9 5 This is particularly true when countries such as the United States, which are in a position to exert
leverage, are lukewarm in their commitments to human
rights.9 6 Indeed, there is a grim irony in the gap between the
picture painted by American foreign policy-namely, that reform is proceeding apace-and the United States's go-slow approach to prosecuting human rights abusers, which frustrates
reform. Our foreign policy rationale for this reluctance is that
more vigorous prosecution would be destabilizing.9 7 This view
implicitly acknowledges that forces of reaction still pose a
threat. That go-slow stance would be less problematic if it did
not contrast so clearly with the willingness of asylum adjudicators, applying the changed conditions doctrine, to deport people
to countries where the United States's reluctance to urge

94. See id. at 35-36 (noting that democracy must include an "intertemporal
dimension: the generalized expectation that ... freedoms will continue into an
indefinite future").
95. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Book Review, 26 POL. THEORY 419, 420
(1998) (reviewing CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996)) (noting
that comprehensive punishment of human rights violators "may bring about a less
than desirable political outcome ... may, in fact, destabilize a fragile, nascent

constitutional regime").
96.

Cf. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 2558 (noting that, after a short period

focusing on human rights immediately after World War II, states began "to avoid
pressing human rights concerns with other governments, in large part because
they feared that such actions would actually exacerbate international tensions");
Schmitter & Karl, supra note 73, at 182-83 (describing the mixed role played by
the United States and other external powers in the transition to democracy
around the world).
97.

See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 2558.
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prosecutions of human rights abusers guarantees that abusers
will still be at large. 8
D. Summary: TransitionScholarship and the Changed
Country ConditionsDoctrine
Summarizing the relationship between transition scholarship and the changed country conditions doctrine is simple:
there is none. The test for democratic consolidation mentioned
above-centering on institutional repertoire, inclusion, and redress-does not appear in the cases in a methodical way, even
in those cases that decline to find changed conditions. Although some cases acknowledge one or more of these factors, 9'
they rarely display sustained transition analysis, raising these
factors only to discount and dismiss them. °° Transition scholars, whose work constitutes the only comprehensive theoretical
and empirical literature on democracy and regime change, are
not cited by courts or agencies. Presumably, these tribunals
instead look to the State Department for comparable expertise.
Yet State Department reports are wholly unsystematic in their
approach. At best, these reports amount to a grab bag of facts
offering little insight into the risks faced by returning refugees.
At worst, they offer an apologia for human rights abuses that is
driven by United States foreign policy concerns rather than the
safety of refugees. While current officials at the State Department are more knowledgeable about human rights issues than
many of their predecessors,' 0 ' it is difficult to overcome the department's institutional culture, which treats human rights as
a distraction from core policy concerns. At the State Department, as well as in asylum-seekers' countries of origin, the dynamic view has it right: merely changing the faces of officials

98. See Martin, supra note 4, at 1332 (discussing distortions in asylum adjudication introduced by the role of the United States Department of State).
99. See Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 1998).
100. See Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the failure of inclusion in Belarus manifested by the President's questioning
of the loyalty of Roman Catholics and the limits on the activities of foreign Catholic priests was insufficient to rebut the INS's position that improved conditions for
Catholics defeated petitioner's asylum claim, despite the State Department's acknowledgment that such developments "do not contribute to a climate of ethnic
and religious tolerance").
101. See Orentlicher, supra note 4 (noting the presence in the State Department of Harold Koh, a prominent human rights expert and advocate).
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does not ensure meaningful change. Asylum tribunals should
address this institutional bias in the State Department with an
approach to changed country conditions that relies less on deference to State Department positions and more on the insights
of transition scholars.
III.

A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO CHANGED COUNTRY
CONDITIONS

The hallmark of a dynamic approach to changed country
conditions adjudication is a careful analysis of conditions "on
the ground" in the asylum seeker's country of origin rather
than blanket deference to State Department conclusions. This
analysis should encompass, not ignore, the insights of the transition scholars. Informing this analysis is a clear message that,
pursuant to Cardoza-Fonsecaand Mogharrabi,asylum adjudicators should resolve uncertainty about country conditions and
the prospects for consolidation of democracy in favor of the
refugee. This approach entails four elements: a) placing the
burden of proof on changed country conditions on the INS in all
cases, not merely those involving proven instances of past persecution; b) requiring specific findings of fact by adjudicators
regarding the crucial elements of institutional repertoire, inclusiveness, and redress; c) requiring independent authority,
beyond State Department reports, to justify a finding of
changed country conditions; and d) requiring the Immigration
Judge conduct the asylum hearing fairly, specifically by allowing the asylum-seeker an opportunity to tell her story.
A. Burden of Proof
The INS already bears the burden of proof regarding
changed country conditions in cases involving past persecution.
The formalistic view would suggest that the refugee should
bear the burden when she has not suffered past persecution, on
the theory that past persecution makes future persecution
more likely. Like most formalistic outcomes, this one has a
logical ring. Further examination, however, reveals that the
reasoning is hollow. The requirement of past persecution for
triggering a shift in the burden of proof penalizes refugees who
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have the luck or wit necessary to evade their pursuers. 10 2 The
past persecution suggests, in effect, that prospective asylumseekers wait to be apprehended by those who wish to kill, confine, or torture them just to establish their refugee bona fides.
Refugees, in contrast, may reasonably believe that moving
early makes more sense than waiting too long. Balancing uncertainty against the gravity of harm here is entirely consistent
with the Cardoza-Fonseca standard requiring a ten-percent
possibility of persecution. If the refugee's testimony is clear,
cohesive, and detailed about events that inspired a wellfounded fear of persecution at the time of her flight from her
country of origin, requiring her to prove that conditions have
not changed materially, poses a distinct tension with CardozaFonseca. To defuse this tension, the burden of proof should
shift to the INS in such cases as well.
B. Specific Findings
A dynamic approach recognizes, however, that burdens of
proof make little difference if asylum adjudicators are free to
defer, without analysis, to State Department conclusions. To
promote careful analysis, adjudicators should make specific
findings on the three criteria for democratic consolidation identified by the transition scholarship: institutional repertoire, inclusiveness, and redress.0 3 These findings should include an
102.

See Margulies, supra note 5.

103. A substantial concern here is that applying these criteria involves asylum adjudicators in an assessment of the legitimacy of the political system of another sovereign state. See Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 17-18 (articulating doubts
about such assessments in asylum cases). In other areas of asylum law, such assessments raise two concerns: 1) whether bias, particularly a foreign-policy based
bias, will skew the adjudicator's evaluation, and 2) whether the adjudicator has
the requisite expertise. See id. These concerns are particularly salient in the
area discussed by Professor Aleinikoff: the refugee status of persons who seek by

violent means to overthrow the government of their country. Generally, governments have the right to punish violent offenses. Exercising that authority is considered "prosecution," not persecution. However, tribunals have indicated, in two
much-discussed cases, that where a government has closed off lawful means for
regime change, violent rebels may still be viewed as refugees. See Dwomoh v.
Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (coup plotters in Ghana); see also In re

Izatula, Interim Dec. No. 3127 (B.I.A. 1990) (Afghan rebels).
Undue stress on whether lawful means for change are available may well
skew adjudication in this context. The State Department's view, which would
clearly have considerable weight, would most likely stem from its view of foreign
policy exigencies, not refugee safety. Cf. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION

LAW AND POLICY 863-71 (1992) (discussing cases and noting that the B.I.A. de-

2000]

FUTURE OF ASYLUM LAW

analysis of countervailing facts in State Department reports.
Consideration of the transition literature also yields more concrete guidance about application of these criteria, which is
briefly set out in the following paragraphs.
1.

Institutional Repertoire

A judge should be able to point to a spectrum of institutions of varying levels of formality, operating with accountability to other institutions, and carrying on a nonviolent dialogue.
In evaluating the institutional repertoire of an asylum-seeker's
cided Dwomoh, involving the United States ally Ghana, against the refugee, only
to be reversed in federal court). Adjudicators would defer to the State Department for substantive reasons of their own, and because of confidence in the State
Department's expertise-much the same scenario that has shaped the formalist
approach critiqued in this article. Rather than court these dangers, most refugee
rebel cases can and should be disposed of, as Aleinikoff suggests, based on the nature of the treatment the rebels would have received from the government they
oppose. The use of torture, for example, would suggest that the government was
punishing rebels for their political beliefs, not for violent criminal activity. See
Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 16-18.
While acknowledging the merits of this alternative approach to refugee rebel
cases, three points are worth making regarding assessments of the legitimacy of
other regimes-the first two about such assessments in the refugee rebel context,
and the third about such assessments in changed country conditions cases. The
first point is that focusing on the nature of the treatment received by the rebel,
including the use of torture, does not dispense with assessments of legitimacy. It
simply moves those assessments to another realm-the legitimacy of torturewhere consensus is greater. Indeed, the fact that this consensus about torture
seems so clearly right suggests that assessments of value in law are both
inevitable and appropriate. See Mensch, supra note 12 (discussing critical
perspective on law and rejecting view of law as "neutral"). Moreover, it is far from
clear that refugee rebels not subject to torture should necessarily be denied
asylum. Consider, for example, a hypothetical case involving French resistance
fighters who blew up a Nazi supply train during World War II. See LEGOMSKY,
supra, at 862 (raising issue). While we know that the Nazis were not exactly shy
about using torture, could an adjudicator deny asylum if it was stipulated that the
French resistance fighters would not be tortured, but would merely be "lawfully"
tried and almost surely executed for blowing up the train? See BROWNING, supra
note 68. I would argue that an adjudicator who denied asylum in the French
resistance case, in the process disclaiming any responsibility for assessing the
character of the Nazi regime, would be practicing formalism at the expense of
refugee protection.
Finally, arguments about bias and expertise in the refugee rebel case are less
compelling in the changed country conditions context. Here, bias is already present, because of reliance on State Department positions. Bringing in the work of
transition scholars would act as a counterweight to that bias. Similarly, the transition scholars' work offers a source of expertise for asylum adjudication untroubled by the State Department's agenda. For these reasons, considering the transition scholars' three core elements-institutional repertoire, inclusion, and
redress-can inform asylum decision making, without imperiling the structure of
asylum adjudication.
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country of origin, asylum adjudicators must consider not
merely a "snapshot" of country conditions yesterday or today,
but in a society over time. Civil society is fragile. It can blossom quickly, as did neighborhood committees in Haiti just prior
to the military coup that deposed President Aristide in 1991, or
as citizens' committees and workers' councils did in the French
Civil society can
and Russian Revolutions, respectively.'
meet its demise just as abruptly.0 5 If volatility has been a
characteristic of a country's political situation as it has been,
for example, in Haiti, much more caution is warranted in
making predictions about the consolidation of democracy in the
10 6
country.
2.

Inclusion

Courts should consider here how well countries have kept
the promise of equality that animates founding moments in
democracies. Commitments often erode under the pressure of
demagoguery over economic difficulties or concern about foreign security threats. Sometimes, as in the American founding
experience, whole groups of people are vulnerable because they
are not viewed by the majority as parties to the original democratic understanding.
Such situations are often reflected in societal structures of
subordination that persist after official policy supposedly has
changed. In this regard, the draft regulations on changed
country conditions advanced by the Justice Department, which
leave the burden of proof with the asylum-seeker to disprove
changed conditions in all cases involving nongovernmental persecution, are fundamentally misguided.0 7 Indeed, such cases,
See generally ARENDT, supra note 9.
105. Historically, the violent suppression of civil society occurs in two settings: 1) when the forces of reaction assert their power, as in Haiti after the coup
in 1991, or 2) when self-styled revolutionaries move to suppress "counter104.

revolutionary" tendencies, as in the French and Russian Revolutions, or, today in
countries such as Afghanistan where Islamic fundamentalist groups like the Taliban have taken power.
106. Moreover, certain kinds of regimes, such as the regimes in Haiti and

Romania that are dominated by a "strong man" and denominated by transition
scholars as "sultanistic," have a greater tendency toward instability in transition
and consolidation. See LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 9, at 364.
107. See New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. 31945 (1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (proposed
June 11, 1998).

2000]

FUTURE OF ASYLUM LAW

contrary to the presumptions suggested under the draft regulations, should be viewed with greater concern than persecution
by governmental actors. °8 In addition, socioeconomic inequity,
although in itself not a sufficient basis for an asylum claim,
should play a role in considerations of the stability of democracies.
3.

Redress

Here the asylum adjudicator should consider the
comprehensiveness of internal investigations of human rights,
the rate of conviction, and the punishment meted out by courts
and other tribunals.' 9 Countries such as South Africa and Argentina that have eschewed wide-ranging punishment in favor
of truth commissions may well comply with this section, as long
as some exemplary punishment has occurred in egregious
cases."0 Countries that have endeavored to sweep the issue of
redress and recognition of abuses under the rug should not be
destinations for asylum-seekers. Related factors include the
depth of interaction between the survivor and persecutor.
When institutions are weak, survivors with greater personal
knowledge of their persecutor should be deemed at greater risk
of retaliation and silencing should they be forced to return.
C. IndependentAuthority for Findingsof Changed
Conditions
The dynamic approach also recognizes that a hallmark of
the formalistic approach is over-reliance on official sources
such as State Department reports."' To address this problem,
asylum adjudicators should seek out evidence beyond mere rote
citation to State Department reports. For example, asylum

108. On occasion, the B.I.A. has recognized this concern. See In re O-Z & IZ, Interim Dec. No. 3346 (B.I.A. Apr. 2, 1998) (discussing depth of anti-Semitism
in the Ukraine). In other cases on similar facts, however, the concern has been
absent.
109. Cf. Martin, supra note 4, at 1282-83 (noting that asylum adjudicators
should consider whether there has been a "complete revamping of the police forces
responsible for the earlier abuses, including reliable disciplining of the violators").
110. See MINOW, supra note 9 (discussing truth commissions as a substitute
for punitive approach); cf. Orentlicher, supra note 4 (arguing for exemplary punishment of prominent human rights abusers).
111. See Martin, supra note 4.
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adjudicators may be called upon to assess what forces, including the military or paramilitary groups, are active in undermining democracy, and how much power those forces possess.
State Department reports indicating that such groups have
been disarmed should be compared rigorously with other
sources of information.
D. Conduct of the Hearing
The respect for the refugee's voice reflected in Mogharrabi
also counsels for greater scrutiny of the manner in which asylum adjudicators question refugees. Asylum fact-finders have
much leeway to probe for inconsistencies in testimony. At
some point, however, probing for inconsistencies ceases to be a
neutral element of sound adjudication, and becomes a selffulfilling prophecy. Adjudicators with an inquisitorial bent
must consider the heavy baggage borne by many asylumseekers. For example, many asylum seekers are fearful of
authority and have suffered trauma that dims their memories
of past events. The need for translation of an asylum-seeker's
testimony is also a source of confusion. Adjudicators whose
questioning is overly obtrusive, impatient, or laden with ad
hominem abuse can effectively silence the asylum-seeker,
mocking Mogharrabi's commitment to hearing the refugee's
voice. Further, rather than reflecting a concern for accurate
testimony, such questioning can also reflect either substantive
bias against refugee narratives or simple frustration that the
asylum-seeker is taking up the adjudicator's time instead of
meekly returning to her country of origin. Appellate adjudicators should carefully consider whether questioning that seems
to pre-judge a case in this fashion has unfairly slanted the
presentation and analysis of changed country conditions evidence. 1 2
IV.

THE DYNAMIC APPROACH IN ACTION: EXAMPLES
FROM THE FIELD

The virtues of the dynamic approach, particularly in its
use of the transitional scholars' criteria of institutional reper-

112. See Garrovillas v. INS, 156 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 1998) (remanding
case in which judge browbeat refugee throughout hearing).
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toire, inclusion, and redress, are evident if one considers examples from the field. This section considers three such examples
that have generated a significant flow of refugees into the
United States: 1) Ethiopia, as an example of problems in transition in Africa; 2) Romania, as an example of problems in
Eastern Europe; and 3) the situation of women in the developing world.
A. Ethiopia
Formalist jurisprudence has heralded the success of transition in Ethiopia. For example, the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed a B.I.A. decision viewing conditions in Ethiopia as having changed materially since the oppressive Mengistu
regime. 113 The B.I.A. cited the State Department Report, noting that the current regime "has vastly improved the past human rights record . ...

[T]he harsh excesses of the Mengistu

regime have ended and [the new regime] has announced explicit guarantees to improve its human rights practices.""' 4
Looking behind the announcements, however, yields a more
pessimistic outlook for Ethiopia. As one commentator puts it,
the formalistic approach to Ethiopian politics is captivated by
"'veneers,' masking sharply contradictory realities of actual
practice."" 5
A more careful look at the tripartite test of the dynamic
approach confirms this assessment. Ethiopia's current government, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front ("EPRDF"), has tolerated only a woefully limited institutional repertoire, with the appearance of elections masking the
persistence of despotism. The EPRDF has suppressed the media, nongovernmental organizations, and trade unions." 6 Inclusion seems to be largely a sham. The Tigrean tribe, which
makes up only ten percent of the population, dominates the
EPRDF, and is extending its hold over other tribes through
"satellite parties" that take orders from EPRDF." 7 Redress is
113. See Belay v. INS, No. 98-1377, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26737 (4th Cir.
Oct. 19, 1998).
114. Id. at *7.
115. John W. Harbeson, Is Ethiopia Democratic? A Bureaucratic,AuthoritarianRegime, 9 J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1998, at 64.
116. See id. at 68.
117. See id. at 66; see also Richard Joseph, Is Ethiopia Democratic? Oldspeak v. Newspeak, 9 J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1998, at 55 (analyzing continued prob-
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in short supply, as the new government engages in a "pervasive
pattern of violations of due process-including torture-at local
levels.""' Indeed, the much commended elections themselves
revealed the seeds of oppression, as the EPRDF, after pledging
prior to the election to ensure that no faction would militarily
its own armies and put them in charge of
intervene, exempted
"security."" 9 This dynamic picture reveals something far less
auspicious than the State Department pieties accorded deference under the formalistic approach. Cardoza-Fonseca would
seem to mandate resolving such uncertainties in favor of the
refugee-seeker.
B. Romania
Romania is a fascinating case study in the uncertainties of
transition in the region where transition has been most celebrated, Eastern Europe. Transition has yielded a spectrum of
results thus far, ranging from "success stories" like the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, to a nightmare like the former
Yugoslavia, with other countries somewhere in between. One
such in-between country, Romania, sank into brutal despotism
while maintaining its political independence from Moscow.
Romania is in some ways the ultimate case study in the pitfalls
of the formalistic approach of relying on one public event, such
as an election, to stand for the whole complex, dynamic process
of democratic consolidation.
The one event experts have pointed to is the election of
1996. In this election, the Democratic Convention of Romania
(CDR) Party and a center-right coalition wrested power from
Ion Ilescu's Social Democracy Party, a group of holdovers from
the tyrannical Ceausescu regime. 2 ° Before this election, observers were virtually unanimous in the view that Romania
lems in Ethiopia). But see Paul B. Henze, Is Ethiopia Democratic? A Political
Success Story, 9 J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1998, at 40 (discussing positive changes in

Ethiopia).
118. Harbeson, supra note 115, at 68.
119. See id. at 67.
120. Ceausescu's rule as a "strong man" is dubbed "sultanistic" by some
commentators, who analogize it to Haiti's rule by the Duvalier family. The decay
of institutions under a sultanistic regime accounts for many of the difficulties in
both Romania and Haiti, countries that in other respects might seem to have little
in common. See LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 9, at 364; cf Jean-Germain Gros,
Haiti's Flagging Transition, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1997, at 94 (noting continuing

instability in Haiti).
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had not truly made a transition to democracy, and looked good
only in comparison with the genocide occurring in the former
Yugoslavia. 12 ' The truncated trial and summary execution of
Ceausescu and his wife led observers to view the change in
government as a kind of camouflaged palace coup, in which the
powers that be decided to jettison the most visible symbol of
their rule so that they could both disclaim any responsibility
for past abuses and also continue in power.'2 2 The new government's underwriting and encouragement of rampages by
miners against student dissidents and opposition groups confirmed this assessment. 2 3 In the wake of the CDR Coalition's
victory in the 1996 election, however, pessimistic assessments
seemed to melt away.'24 The United States State Department
echoed these sentiments, celebrating the belated consolidation
to democracy, and recommending that, while some abuses continued, victims could easily correct them by resort to the country's "nascent ...legal institutions."25
Courts and agencies engaged in adjudicating Romanian
asylum claims in the United States have, more often than not,
bought into the State Department's optimism. 12 6 This deference is unfortunate because here, too, the formal outlines

121. See LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 9, at 345.
Of the former Warsaw pact countries... Romania... had the last
transition,... the most violent regime termination,... [and is] where
the successor regime committed the most egregious violations of human
rights ....[T]he democratic opposition has yet to win a national election... [and] a former high Communist official was not only elected to
the Presidency in the first free election, but re-elected.
Id.
122. See id. at 359.
123. See id. at 361-62.
124. See Michael Shafir, Romania's Road to "Normalcy," J. DEMOCRACY,
Apr. 1997, at 144.
125. See Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1082 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).
126. See Petre v. INS, No. 97-70945, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2005, at *3 (9th
Cir., Feb. 3, 1999) (affirming B.I.A.'s deference to State Department); see also
Marcu, 147 F.3d 1078 (same). But see Misca v. INS, No. 97-70909, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 786 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1999) (remanding for further proceedings); In re
T-P-, No. A74 648 334 (B.I.A. Nov. 3, 1998) (reversing IJ's denial of asylum). The
general pattern of deference to the State Department is most apparent if one realizes 1) that most B.I.A. decisions in the future will, because of the restrictive
provisions of the 1996 Act, probably not be subject to significant judicial review,
and 2) that even a final decision for the refugee at the B.I.A. or federal court level
is the product of the refugee's persistence in the face of one or more negative decisions below. See supra note 19 (discussing appeal and review of determinations in
asylum cases).
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traced by one election do not a democracy make. Further examination reveals that institutional repertoire is still notable
only by its absence. Coordination between branches of government is nonexistent in Romania, since the Prime Minister
rules by bypassing parliament through decrees instead of by
proposing legislation.'2 7 Civil society is undeveloped: the extremist miners, the most powerful group, recently engaged in a
bloody march on the capital.12 8 Inclusion is also a problem, as
rumors percolate to the surface about treasonous machinations
by the country's ethnic Hungarian minority, 129 and an extremist party known for its attacks on ethnic Hungarians and Jews
has gained standing.13 ° Finally, redress is a more difficult burden than the country's "nascent" institutions can bear, as both
3
human rights abusers and corrupt officials enjoy impunity." "
Despite these concerns, Romania may yet consolidate its democracy. The path to consolidation will, however, almost certainly take many detours not foreseen in the euphoria of the
1996 elections, paths that could be lethal for asylum-seekers
forced to return.
C. Change and Women's Rights
A new frontier for the changed country conditions doctrine
is also a new frontier for asylum law generally: women's rights
and gender issues. The most important new development in
asylum law in the past five to ten years has been the expansion
of the notion of persecution based on membership in a particu-

127. See Virginia Marsh, Dissent into the Chaos of Democracy, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 28, 1998, at 2.
128. See Romanian Miners, supra note 47, at A3.
129. See, e.g., Gabriel Ronay, Bishop Who Toppled DictatorshipSaid to BE
[sic] Communist Spy, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, July 26, 1998, at 16 (detailing apparently baseless charges by extremist, ultra-nationalist group that ethnic Hungarian Bishop, who sparked revolt against Ceausescu, was a spy and Communist
collaborator).
130. See Marsh, supra note 127. But see Ronay, supra note 129, at 16 (arguing that extremist parties have muted their anti-Semitic and anti-Hungarian
rhetoric as they gained support).
131. Cf. Marsh, supra note 127 (noting in 1998 that government anticorruption campaign has "flopped"). But cf. Shafir, supra note 124, at 157 (expressing optimism about anti-corruption campaign shortly after the 1996 election).
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lar social group to include claims of persecution based on gen13 2
der.
Asylum based on fear of male violence and cultural practices such as female genital cutting are examples of this powerful trend. 1 3 The threat here is that formal legal reforms in
countries around the world, through the changed conditions
doctrine, will operate in the
future to defeat legitimate gender34
based claims for asylum.
This development would be tragic because, on gender issues in particular, there is typically a wide gap between the official changes celebrated by the formalistic view and conditions
"on the ground." Governments around the world that have
taken the seismic steps of outlawing rape and male violence
against intimate partners deserve applause. However, changes
in the official climate regarding women's rights still contend
with the time-honored relegation of many facets of women's
oppression, such as intimate violence, to a non-official, domestic sphere. As one commentator has noted, "[1]egislative and
constitutional changes... are irrelevant unless they are adhered to and legitimated by people in their day-to-day prac" 135
tices.

132. See Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered
Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 665 (1998)
(discussing strengths and pitfalls of immigration legislation on violence against
women). See generally Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly, InternationalHuman
Rights and Violence Against Women, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 195 (1993) (analyzing
male violence against women as basis for asylum). Immigration remedies for
other groups of women, including spouses of abusive United States citizens and
residents, have also expanded.
133. See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. No. 3,278 at 15 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996)
(holding that female genital mutilation can be basis for asylum claim). But see In
re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364 (B.I.A. June 11, 1999) (holding that fear of domestic
violence generally is not a basis for asylum). See generally Isabelle R. Gunning,
Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and MulticulturalFeminism: The Case of
Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 (1991-92) (discussing complexities of human rights stance regarding female genital cutting); Peter
Margulies, The Violence of Law and Violence Against Women, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L.
& LITERATURE 179 (1996) (same).

134. In some recent gender-related asylum claims, the Immigration Clinic at
St. Thomas Law School has encountered skepticism from Immigration Judges,
who have relied in part on supposedly improved conditions for women.
135. Tripp, supra note 84, at 105. In addition, the direction of changes is not
necessarily positive. See Teemu Ruskola, Law, Sexual Morality, and Gender
Equality in Qing and Communist China, 103 YALE L.J. 2531, 2553 (1994) (noting
that, with respect to women's equality, "the gap between the letter of the law and
legal reality in the area of sex offenses appears in fact to be greater" in Commu-
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This suggests that courts should apply the changed conditions doctrine very gingerly in gender-based cases. The institutional repertoire supporting positive changes in the field in the
area of women's rights is often sadly lacking. Despite encouraging pronouncements and legislative changes, women
throughout the world must struggle daily for the ability to mobilize and participate in both civil society and political institutions.'3 6 Inclusiveness is also a crucial obstacle to such efforts.
For example, class 3 7 and religious 138 differences among women
frustrate mobilization and allow male guardians of privilege to
play one group of women against another. Redress is impossible in countries where, despite changes in "law on the books,"
security forces and police collaborate with entrenched patriarchal interests to suppress women's mobilization.'
nist China than under the Confucian dynasty that ruled China for most of the
past three centuries).
136. See Gisela Geisler, Troubled Sisterhood: Women and Politics in Southern Africa, 94 AFR. AFF. 545, 547 (1995). Geisler cites the frequent use by males
in Botswana of the proverb, "cows never lead the bull," as evidence that:
Ideologies that prescribe the private domestic sphere as the female domain and the public-and political-as a male prerogative are deeply
engrained in peoples' minds, and they are backed by recourse to 'tradition' and 'custom' and laws that create barriers for women to deal independently with the world outside the home.
Id.; see also Kole A. Shettima, Engendering Nigeria's Third Republic, 38 AFR.
STUD. REV., Dec. 1995, at 61, 67 (noting in Nigeria, "token women appointed to
public offices,... the failure of women to be elected and the bureaucratic processes which made a mockery of the enfranchisement of women"); cf. Tripp, supra
note 84, at 101 (discussing how pressure from male council officials led to closing
of a women's health clinic in Uganda).
137. See Tripp, supra note 84, at 100 (noting that wealthier women, dependent on men for their economic status, were afraid to express solidarity with
women of less means openly, because of concern about losing their status, although these women collaborated clandestinely).
138. See id. at 99 (discussing how Protestant male leaders in Ugandan
community attacked women activists for working with Catholic and Muslim
women); cf. Sara Hossain, Equality in the Home: Women's Rights and Personal
Laws in South Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 465, 474 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (discussing
how shifts toward religious fundamentalism in South Asia have slowed or halted
progress in women's rights); Frances E. Olsen, Feminism in Central and Eastern
Europe: Risks and Possibilities of American Engagement, 106 YALE L.J. 2215
(1997) (arguing that resurgent nationalism and religious traditionalism in postCommunist Eastern Europe have worsened the situation of women).
139. See Tripp, supra note 84, at 94, 103 (describing how police and security
forces intimidated women's group and other residents protesting lack of community input into infrastructural rehabilitation funded by World Bank); see also id.
at 94, 103 (discussing how male vendors in urban market enlisted governmental
aid in evicting women's co-operative from market stalls, and beat women who pro-
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CONCLUSION
These studies of human rights "on the ground" demonstrate the fragility of reform and the peril for refugees that
persist under the veneer of changed conditions. Careful analysis, as well as sobering stories from the headlines reveal the
wisdom of the dynamic approach, which views governmental
change as contingent, fluid, and prone to changes in direction.
Both analysis and current events reveal the failure of the formalist view, with its focus on law "on the books" and changes in
the identity of government officials; its impatience with the
admittedly complex interaction of law, politics, society, and history; and its equation of "objectivity" with deference to the
State Department.
The dynamic and formalistic models contend throughout
the body of asylum law. The dynamic model invokes precedents like Cardoza-Fonseca and Mogharrabi, which consider
the refugee's circumstances as they acknowledge the inevitable
uncertainty of information and prediction in the asylum context, and the disproportionate impact of such uncertainty on
the refugee. This line of precedent rejects a formalistic notion
of objectivity, holding, in Cardoza-Fonseca,that a refugee need
not prove that persecution in her country of origin is more
probable than not to demonstrate a "reasonable" fear, and
holding, in Mogharrabi, that even without corroboration, a
refugee's testimony can be sufficiently "objective" to support a
grant of asylum. Unfortunately, the changed conditions doctrine in asylum law revives mechanical approaches to objectivity, and in the process undermines asylum protections.
Ironically, the role of changed conditions doctrine in asylum law is itself a case study supporting the dynamic model.
Changed country conditions treat the resolution of uncertainties about information and prediction as the refugee's responsibility. Yet precedents about changed country conditions do not
directly challenge either Mogharrabi or Cardoza-Fonseca;the
law on the books remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the logic
tested their eviction); Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private:A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights
Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 138, at 85, 100 (discussing how
indifference of police to women's domestic violence complaints constitutes a ratification of male power); Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and
Rights: A Reconceptualization of Violence for the 21" Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607
(1997) (deconstructing power relations that obscure violence against women).
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of deference to the State Department in matters regarding
changed country conditions alters the standard of proof refugees must meet: the ten-percent possibility of persecution
deemed material in Cardoza-Fonsecachanges to a requirement
of a clear probability of persecution if the refugee is forced to
return. It effects this alteration in the standard by requiring
the refugee to come forward with evidence that outweighs, as
in a preponderance standard, the State Department's conclusion that conditions have changed. In addition, requiring new
evidence from the refugee also effectively undermines Mogharrabi by forcing the refugee to produce corroboration from her
country of origin, even though both Cardoza-Fonseca and
Mogharrabi recognize that bureaucracy, chaos, and fear can
make such evidence extremely difficult for refugees to obtain.
Typically, the formalist invocation of objectivity in changed
country conditions cases only flows one way: against the refugee. When, for example, State Department reports include adverse information about a country where conditions allegedly
have improved, changed country conditions cases, particularly
decisions from the new tribunal of virtual last resort, the
B.I.A., skate over that information with barely a mention. This
disregard of unfavorable evidence stems not from neutrality or
objectivity, but from the deference to the status quo that underlies most legal formalism.
Such deference is particularly inappropriate because the
overwhelming body of scholarly research about transitions to
democracy embraces a dynamic model. This model focuses on
three criteria for successful transitions: 1) institutional repertoire, 2) inclusion, and 3) redress. Analysis of country conditions based on these criteria will offer a meaningful response to
the refugee's uncertainty about the treatment she will encounter if she is forced to return to her country of origin. However,
the cases reveal at best sporadic attempts to integrate the
learning of the transition scholars with asylum law. Case
studies such as Romania, Ethiopia, and the condition of women
in developing countries, reveal that adjudicators who ignore
the framework established in transitional scholarship risk disproof from conditions on the ground and current events.
The rigidity built into changed conditions doctrine, along
with the virtual unreviewability of B.I.A. decisions under the
1996 Immigration Act, create the real prospect that asylum law
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will die a "slow death." 4 ° Here, however, refugees, scholars,
and advocates can take some comfort from the dynamic model.
Because change is fluid and unpredictable, pessimism can turn
out to be misplaced. The B.I.A., empowered by its unreviewability, may rise to the occasion by advancing a more dyThis
namic model of changed country conditions doctrine.'
article offers some signposts along the way.

140. See Schedler, supra note 9, at 97 (analyzing the 'slow death" of democracy that occurs with the withering of democratic institutions).
141. One recent decision suggests that this scenario is not wholly implausible. See In re O-Z & I-Z, Interim Dec. No. 3346, at 2-5 (B.I.A. Apr. 2, 1998) (acknowledging persistence of societal anti-Semitism in the Ukraine).
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